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Introduction
The impact of the financial sector on the real economy is subtle and
complex.  What distinguishes financial institutions from other firms is the
relatively small share of real assets on their balance sheets.  Thus, the direct impact
of financial institutions on the real economy is relatively minor.   Nonetheless, the
indirect impact of financial markets and institutions on economic performance is
extraordinarily important.  The financial sector mobilizes savings and allocates
credit across space and time.  It provides not only payment services, but more
importantly products which enable firms and households to cope with economic
uncertainties by hedging, pooling, sharing, and pricing risks.  An efficient financial
sector reduces the cost and risk of producing and trading goods and services and
thus makes an important contribution to raising standards of living.
This paper examines the relationship between the financial sector and
economic performance highlighting the role of government in maintaining an
efficient financial system. It does so in several stages.  In the first section, in order
to provide a clear standard for comparison, we begin by considering how an
economy would perform without a financial sector. In the second section, we
proceed to introduce a simplified financial sector with direct financial transactions2
between savers and investors.  We then introduce financial intermediaries which
transform the direct obligations of investors into indirect obligations of financial
intermediaries which have attributes that savers prefer.  This section emphasizes
how the financial sector can improve both the quantity and quality of real
investment and thereby increase income per capita.  
The third section considers the role of government in supporting an efficient
financial sector.  We explain why some financial institutions may be vulnerable to
collapse and the consequence this may have for the functioning of the economy.
Then we review the system of circuit breakers which societies have developed to
prevent a shock to one part of the financial system from destroying other financial
institutions and damaging the real economy.  In addition we consider the role of
government in fostering efficient financial markets.
The fourth section recognizes that not all government intervention in the
financial sector is beneficial.  We review the potentially detrimental effects of
regulation on both the financial structure and the real economy.  We also
emphasize the competitive forces that influence the ultimate impact of regulations.
Before advances in technology and financial theory stimulated financial
innovations and before advances in telecommunications lowered the cost of cross-
border transactions, national regulators enjoyed considerable autonomy in
regulating domestic markets and institutions.  Under current conditions, national
regulators may continue to behave autonomously; but, the main result of more
burdensome regulations may be to induce users and providers of financial services
to shift to less heavily regulated products or locations, thus undermining the
objectives which motivated the change in regulations.  This dynamic process has
become increasingly competitive as regulators in some countries have actively3
sought a greater share of international financial business.  Technological trends in
telecommunications and computation seem likely to increase the ease with which
users and providers of financial services can circumvent burdensome regulations.
This has led to calls for reduction in the overall restrictions on financial firms, as
well as for international harmonization of regulations regarding safety and
soundness, insider trading and taxation.
The fifth section begins with an examination of how to quantify the gains to
the economy from improving the efficiency of the financial sector.  We also
consider the evolving structure of financial institutions in the contemporary world
economy and review the trend toward the formation of financial conglomerates and
specialized firms with an emphasis on identifying the forces which are causing
structural changes.  We examine the potential social gains as well as costs which
may result from the formation of financial conglomerates.  We then analyze
appropriate policies and regulations which will enable society to realize the
potential benefits of the optimal organizational structure of financial firms. 
The sixth section discusses pressures for international harmonization of
financial regulation.  Institutional regulation is contrasted with functional
regulation.  The collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group is examined for
its implications for the efficacy of functional regulation.  Section VII provides a
brief summary and concluding comments.
I. Savings, Investment and Economic Performance Without a Financia l
Sector
In order to understand the role of the financial sector in enhancing economic
performance, it is useful to begin with a benchmark case in which there is no
financial sector.  Without financial instruments each household would necessarily4
be self-financing and would make autonomous savings and investment decisions
without regard for the opportunity cost of using those resources elsewhere in
society. 
Three fundamental decisions which influence economic performance -- (1)
how much to save and how to allocate the flow of savings; (2) how much to
consume; and (3) how to allocate the existing stock of wealth -- would depend on
each autonomous household's opportunities, present and expected future income,
tastes, health, family composition, the costs of goods and services, and confidence
in the future.  Although barter transactions among households would permit some
specialization in production, the extent of specialization would be severely limited
by the necessity for each household to be self-financing.    
The structure of financial flows can be captured in a method of analysis
called the "flow of funds." This is a useful analytical tool for tracing the flow of
funds through an economy.  This device has been used for evaluating the
interaction between the financial and real aspects of the economy for nearly a half
century (Copeland (1955) and Goldsmith (1965)).   The basic building block is a
statement of the sources and uses of resources for each economic unit over some
period of time, usually a year.  In this case the economic units are households and
the sources and uses of resources accounts (Table 1) reflect the changes in each
household's balance sheet over the year.  Since, at this point in the analysis
financial instruments do not exist, all assets are real and there are no liabilities.
(Other categories of financial instruments which will be introduced later are shaded
in gray.)  Changes in real assets, here the accumulation of goods, reflect savings
or changes in net worth; dissavings result in corresponding declines in real assets.5
By aggregating sources and uses accounts for each economic unit, a matrix
of flows of funds can be constructed for the entire economy.  For illustrative
purposes we have introduced a primitive economy with two households.  This case
is presented in Table 2.  Although other sectors are listed, they are irrelevant at this
stage of the analysis because we have assumed that there are no financial
instruments which can link one sector to another.  These parts of the matrix (which
will be introduced later) have been shaded gray.  
In this example, we have inserted arbitrary entries for each household.
Household 1 is saving 80 units of current income, while household 2 saves only 40.
If productive opportunities were fortuitously distributed across households in such
a way that each household earned precisely the same rate of return on its stock of
real assets, this economy could prosper without a financial sector.  Such an
outcome is highly unlikely, however, because investment opportunities and desired
savings are apt to differ markedly across households.  Moreover, there is no
assurance that households with high savings have commensurately greater or more
profitable real investment opportunities.  
If, for example, household 2's desired investment exceeded its current
savings, its investment would have to be postponed until it could accumulate
sufficient savings even if its investment opportunities offer substantially higher
returns than the investment opportunities available to household 1.  Similarly if
household 1 lacks attractive investment opportunities it may undertake inferior
investment projects or save less.  Society's flow of savings is inefficiently allocated
and the stock of investment is less productive than it might otherwise be.  Both the
quality of capital formation and the quantity of future output suffer, and the
standard of living in this society is less than it would be if household 1 could be6
      Higher returns on financial instruments may encourage saving; but higher returns also
1
enable savers to achieve a target stock of wealth with a lower rate of saving.  Thus in theory
the impact of expected returns on the overall savings rate is ambiguous.  Empirical studies
across a number of countries have not been able to resolve the question.  Nonetheless, higher
returns on financial instruments will induce households to allocate more savings to financial
instruments than to real assets (and, in an open economy, to shift from foreign to domestic
assets).  Efficient financial markets will allocate financial claims to projects which offer the
highest, risk-adjusted returns and so income and total savings are likely to rise even though
the savings rate may not.  
induced to transfer at least some of its resources to household 2 in exchange for a
financial claim.  
A "financial claim" is a contractual agreement entitling the holder to a future
payoff from some other economic entity.  Unlike a real asset, it does not provide
its owner with a stream of  physical services. Rather it is valued for the stream of
payoffs it is expected to return over time.  The financial claim is both a store of
value and a way of redistributing income over time which may be much more
attractive to the saver than the stream of services the saver could anticipate from
his own investment opportunities in real assets.  
Given the assumptions in our simple case it is conceivable that a bargain
could be arranged between household 1 and household 2.  In exchange for
household 1's real assets, household 2 could issue a financial claim to household
1 that would promise a more attractive pattern of payoffs than the investment
opportunities available to household 1.  This reallocation of assets between
household 1 and household 2 could increase the return on capital formation for this
society.  Indeed, the possibility of investing in financial claims that are more
attractive than household 1's own real investment opportunities might even
increase the savings of household 1 and thus increase the total quantity as well as
the quality of capital formation.
17
II. The Workings of a Simplified Financial Sector
II.A. A Financial Sector With Direct Financial Claims 
To examine how a financial sector affects the economy we will introduce the
direct financial claims suggested above -- claims held by ultimate savers which are
liabilities of those who invest in real assets.  The exposition is further simplified
by introducing a second sector in the economy.  Assume that firms specialize in
investing in real assets financed by issuance of direct financial liabilities, while
households specialize in saving and investing in these direct financial claims.
Financial claims are reflected in the flow of funds accounts as liabilities of firms,
but, as assets of households.  Real assets, however, appear only on the balance
sheet of the sector which owns them.  Sector relationships can be seen by
aggregating all members of a sector together.   Of course, aggregation obscures
details of financial interactions within sectors because financial assets and
liabilities are netted out; the real asset total for a sector is the sum of real assets
over each unit in the sector. 
The flow of funds matrix in Table 3 illustrates such a system and reflects the
sort of qualitative changes which occur when a market economy industrializes.  It
differs from the flow of funds matrix in Table 2 in three respects:  (1) firms hold
most of the real assets; (2) households hold direct financial claims on firms --
equity and bonds -- in lieu of most of their previous holdings of real assets; and (3)
household savings have increased by (an arbitrary) 10 units to reflect the enhanced
level of income which could be gained from reallocating real assets to more
productive uses.  Generally, the higher an economy's per capita income, the higher
the ratio of financial assets to real assets.8
What makes this reallocation of resources possible?  What induces
households to exchange real assets for direct financial claims on firms?  The simple
answer is that the direct financial liabilities which firms offer promise more
attractive rates of return than households could expect to earn from investing in real
assets themselves. In short, they shift from real investment to the purchase of
financial claims because they expect it to be profitable to do so. But this glib
answer ignores several important obstacles which must be overcome in order to
induce savers to give up real assets in exchange for direct financial claims.  
The fundamental problem is that once savers no longer directly invest in real
assets, they must worry about the performance of those whose actions determine
the returns on their financial investments.  They must be concerned about "adverse
selection" -- the possibility that they may invest in incompetent firms with poor
prospects instead of competent firms with good productive opportunities.  And they
must be concerned with "moral hazard" -- the possibility that firms may not honor
their commitments once they have received resources from investors.  In order to
protect against adverse selection and moral hazard, the saver must spend a
considerable amount of resources in deciding how to allocate savings.  The
activities involved include:  (a) collecting and analyzing information about firms;
(b) negotiating a contract that will limit the firm's opportunities for taking
advantage of the saver; (c) monitoring the firm's performance; and, if necessary,
(d) enforcing the contract.  If each individual saver must incur these costs and if the
financing needs of the firm are large relative to the resources of any individual
saver, the information and transactions costs may be so great that direct financing
is not feasible.9
Financial market infrastructure has evolved in most developed countries
which reduces some of these costs.  Accounting standards, disclosure laws and
ratings agencies reduce some of the costs of information which would otherwise
be borne by individual savers.  Contracting conventions, securities laws, and a
judicial system which renders predictable verdicts reduce the costs of negotiating
and enforcing financial contracts.  Bankers may facilitate the matching of
borrowers' needs and savers' preferences by underwriting an issue of direct
securities and dividing them into smaller denominations to distribute to ultimate
savers.   These markets, conventions and institutions may make it possible for
small savers to hold direct claims on firms and achieve a greater return for any
given level of risk in allocating their wealth.
The development of secondary markets in which direct claims are traded also
increases the willingness of savers to exchange real assets for direct financial
claims.  Brokers, which match savers and investors, as well as organized markets,
which publish prices at which direct claims have recently been traded, increase the
efficiency of direct financial transactions.  They provide valuable price signals to
help price new issues of direct claims and to coordinate decentralized economic
activity. In addition, they reduce search and information costs for issues of new
direct financial claims.
Moreover, confidence in the liquidity of the secondary market for a direct
financial claim encourages savers to accept longer maturity claims.  Indeed,
secondary markets are valuable even to savers who do not plan to sell the direct
financial claim.  Because uncertainty is a pervasive feature of economic life,  the
ability to sell a direct claim in a liquid secondary market in order to reallocate10
portfolio holdings or increase consumption is a valuable option which will increase
a saver's willingness to exchange real resources for a financial claim.  
This liquidity of secondary markets can be enhanced through dealers who
stand ready to buy or sell direct claims at stated prices.  They are able to do so
because they hold an inventory of such claims and because they have better access
to potential buyers and sellers than other market participants.  By providing the
service of immediacy, dealers add another level of confidence to the market and
increase the willingness of the household sector to engage in direct financial
transactions.
II.B. A Financial Sector With Financial Intermediaries
Nonetheless, transactions and information costs may deter some savers from
buying direct financial claims on some firms.  The possibility of significantly
reducing these transactions and information costs for some savers and borrowers
provides an opportunity for financial intermediation to thrive.    Financial
intermediaries purchase direct financial claims and issue their own liabilities;  in
essence they transform direct claims into indirect claims.  The fundamental
rationale for such institutions is that they can intermediate more cheaply between
some savers and some borrowers than what the ultimate borrowers would pay and
the ultimate saver would receive in a direct transaction.  Financial intermediaries
enhance the efficiency of the financial system if the indirect claim is more
attractive to the ultimate saver and/or if the ultimate borrower is able to sell a direct
claim at a more attractive price to the financial intermediary than to ultimate
savers. 
The financial sector offers many different products to savers and investors
through a number of institutions  -- banks, savings banks, cooperatives, insurance11
      Yet much of the complexity is obscured by the convention of aggregating flows by sector. 
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Financial flows among financial firms are often very large relative to flows vis-a-vis other
sectors.  For example, interbank trading in the foreign exchange markets is roughly 90% of
total volume and interbank transactions in the Eurocurrency markets are virtually two-thirds
of the total.  
companies, investment banks, mutual funds, finance companies and other
institutions.  In some countries, institutions are segmented along product lines and
regulated separately.  For example, it has been common in most countries for
regulation to segment deposit-taking institutions from insurance companies.  In
some countries segmentation of deposit-taking institutions from securities firms
has also been the tradition.  However, increasingly, product-line distinctions among
institutions are fading (a trend we examine in Section V).  
For convenience we will discuss depository financial intermediaries as the
archetypal financial institution.  Depository institutions are usually the largest
financial institutions in countries that require separation of financial institutions
along product lines and they are usually the core of financial conglomerates in
countries which do not require specialization.  Moreover, depository institutions
play a central role in the payments system and are regulated within every
developed country.  Increasingly, depository institutions are regulated
internationally as well.  
A comparison of the Flow of Funds Matrix for an economy with only direct
financial claims (Table 3) with the Flow of Funds Matrix for an economy with both
direct and indirect financial claims (Table 4) reveals a more complex pattern of
financing,  a pattern of financial deepening which usually accompanies economic
2
development (Goldsmith (1965)).  The household sector has substituted much of
its holdings of direct financial claims for "indirect financial claims" -- claims on12
financial firms.  Correspondingly, most of the direct financial claims on non-
financial firms are held by financial firms.  Also, the household sector has a better
opportunity to borrow from financial institutions since the scale of borrowing by
individual households seldom warrants the heavy fixed costs of issuing a direct
financial claim.  In accord with the assumption that the introduction of financial
intermediaries will improve the allocation of capital and raise the level of income,
both household sector savings and real assets have risen.  Notice that total
household savings has risen from 130 units to 145 units in the example.  
But how can financial institutions link some savers and investors more
efficiently than direct market transactions between the household sector and non-
financial firms?   Several factors may explain the relatively greater efficiency of
intermediation for some borrowers and some savers.  First, financial intermediaries
may be able to collect and evaluate information regarding creditworthiness at lower
cost and with greater expertise than the household sector.  And, when some
information regarding creditworthiness is confidential or proprietary, the borrower
may prefer to deal with a financial intermediary rather than disclose information
to a rating agency or to a large number of individual lenders in the market at large.
Second, transactions costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a
financial contract may be lower for a financial intermediary than for the household
sector since there are likely to be economies of scale which can be realized from
investment in the fixed costs of maintaining a specialized staff of legal and
workout experts.  In addition, by handling other aspects of the borrower's financial
dealings, the financial intermediary may be in a better position to monitor changes
in the borrower's creditworthiness.13
Third, the financial intermediary can often transform a direct financial claim
with attributes which the borrower prefers into an indirect claim with attributes
which savers prefer.  This often occurs when the borrower needs large amounts for
relatively long periods of time, while savers prefer to hold smaller-denomination
claims for shorter periods of time.  By pooling the resources of many savers, the
financial intermediary may be able to accommodate the preferences of both the
borrower and savers.  
Fourth, the financial intermediary often has a relative advantage in reducing
and hedging risk.  By purchasing a number of direct claims on different borrowers
whose prospects are less than perfectly correlated, the financial intermediary is
able to reduce fluctuations in the value of the portfolio of direct claims, given the
expected return, relative to holdings of any one of the direct claims with the same
expected return.  Diversification reduces the financial intermediary's net exposure
to a variety of risks and thus reduces the cost of hedging.  
The upshot is that a financial intermediary is often able to transform risky,
long-term, illiquid direct claims on borrowers into safer, shorter-term, liquid claims
on itself that savers prefer.  Indeed, a substantial proportion of these indirect claims
at depository institutions are redeemable at face value on demand and are an
important part of the payments system.  Thus, it is not surprising that in highly
developed financial systems, the household sector holds relatively few direct
financial claims.  In the United States for example, less than 10% of direct
financial claims are held by the household sector.
II.C. Completing the Financial Sector:  Adding the Go vernment and Foreign
Sectors14
A more realistic flow of funds matrix differs from our example in that it
would include two additional sectors.  First is the government sector which affects
the flow of funds in two distinct ways. It issues liabilities to the financial sector
which serve as the reserve base for the money supply.  It also issues liabilities to
finance its own spending to the extent that tax revenues fall short of government
expenditures.   Modern governments have increasingly entered the capital markets
to finance government activity in competition for savings with non-financial firms.
Borrowing needs result from the fact that desired government expenditures for
purchases of goods and services and the redistribution of income often exceed
current tax revenues.  To finance this shortfall the Treasury enters the market as a
supplier of direct claims in competition with other borrowers. 
In addition, in command economies, the government replaces financial
markets with bureaucratic decision-making to determine resource allocation.
Government financial transactions entirely displace private market activity.  The
collapse of COMECON has revealed some appalling examples of the inefficiencies
which may result.
Table 5 shows the flow of funds matrix which incorporates the government
sector.  The government is shown with a deficit of 33 units which causes a
corresponding reduction in net household savings.  Some economists argue that
current deficits lead to a one for one increase in household savings in anticipation
of higher future tax burdens (Barro (1974)).  Other economists regard this view as
too extreme in light of recent empirical evidence (Hausman and Poterba (1987)).
Table 5 depicts a case in which households make a partial response to the
government deficit:  household savings rise from 145 units to 150 units. The
government issues 50 units of financial liabilities to fund its current and capital15
expenditures as well as its subsidies to favored private sector borrowers.  In our
example, real sector investment declines in spite of subsidies from the government
to the private sector.  Total real sector assets decline from 151 units in Table 4 to
117 units in Table 5, indicative of the "crowding out" of private sector investment
by government funding demands.
Second, to complete the flow of funds, we add the international sector.  As
national economies have become increasingly interdependent, cross-border
financial transactions of all kinds have become commonplace.  Opening a country
to trade in financial assets offers advantages similar to those that we observed in
introducing financial instruments in the primitive economy.  World savings may
be allocated more efficiently so that national income in all countries is increased.
International specialization on the basis of comparative advantage in financial
services, like international specialization in production, is likely to enhance
efficiency. In fact, some countries may find their comparative advantage is in
providing financial services to the world economy.  Financial services may become
important traded goods like automobiles or aircraft.  Under these circumstances the
size of the financial sector is likely to be dictated by world demand rather than
domestic demand.
Competition from foreign institutions also stimulates innovations to cut costs
and expand the range of products.  Moreover,  the broader range of financial
instruments available enhances the scope for diversification to reduce country-
specific risks.  Kuwait provides a grim, but timely, example of the risk-reducing
advantages of maintaining an internationally diversified portfolio of assets. 
Table 6 shows the complete flow of funds matrix. In this example the
national economy is running a current account deficit of 28.  This deficit is16
financed by net financial inflows that provide both debt and equity to the domestic
economy and by drawing down some of the domestic economy's holdings of
foreign assets. Household savings reflect the benefits of opening the economy to
the world capital market by increasing to 155 units.  The non-financial sector
benefits from the net inflow of capital.  Net domestic real investment increases
from 117 in Table 5 to 150 in Table 6.
III. Policies Supporting Financial Flows
In view of the importance of the financial sector to economic performance,
it is not surprising that both financial institutions and financial markets are subject
to regulatory scrutiny.  Regulation can be beneficial to those who issue direct
claims as well as to those who invest.  It also benefits financial intermediaries and
their customers if it can reduce expenditures on information gathering and
monitoring.  Moreover, maintenance of confidence in the safety and soundness of
financial institutions is critical to macroeconomic stability (Guttentag and Herring
(1987) and Santomero (1992)).  We shall review the regulation and supervision of
one important category of financial intermediary -- depository institutions -- and
then turn to an examination of financial market regulation.  First, however, we will
examine the fundamental role of government in providing a stable environment for
economic decision-making.  
III.A. Stable Macroeconomic Policies
Probably the most important contribution the government can make to the
efficient functioning of financial markets is to provide a steady, consistent, stable
macroeconomic policy.  This consists of predictable interventions in financial
markets and stable fiscal policy.  The government enters the financial markets
directly through its issuance of bonds in the primary market (A in Figure 1),17
through the central bank's use of open market operations in the secondary market
(B in Figure 1), and direct loans to financial institutions which are crucial
participants in the financial systems (C in Figure 1).  
In addition, tax and government expenditure policies affect not only the
general level of aggregate demand and the demand for financial products, but may
exert a strong influence over preferences for certain kinds of securities.  Private
borrowers will normally have strong incentives to minimize the tax consequences
of financing decisions.  Similarly, investors will value securities in terms of their
after-tax returns and will be influenced by their marginal tax rates. Frequent
changes in tax rates can be very disruptive to financial markets because such
changes may cause substantial unanticipated redistributions of income and lead to
massive reallocations of asset portfolios.  
In addition, the tax structure itself has a substantial impact on the financial
markets.  Asymmetries in the tax treatment of dividends, interest income, inflation-
adjusted returns or capital gains can undermine the efficiency with which  financial
markets allocate funds by creating artificial incentives for some investors to prefer
particular financial instruments.  Also, if financial transactions are heavily taxed,
serious distortions occur.  Markets may literally become uneconomical as a result
of the tax burden or substantial amounts of financial activity may be displaced to
foreign or offshore markets.  In this regard, it is important to consider the rate of
taxation in the appropriate context.  Levies, which may be small in the absolute
terms, may nonetheless be large relative to transfer costs or the yield on such
instruments over a short period.  Thus, even tax rates which appear small relative
to total asset value may prove quite disruptive to an orderly, efficient market.Figure 118
      For additional discussion of the rationale for bank regulation see Black, Miller and Posner
3
(1978), Corrigan (1987), Guttentag and Herring (1987, 1988), Kareken and Wallace (1978),
Santomero (1992).
      For an extensive discussion of the reasons why many business loans are not marketable,
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and why such loans may be preferred by borrowers over securities, see Guttentag and Herring
(1986c) and Santomero (1988).
Even if the government attempts to maintain a stable macroeconomic
environment, however, unanticipated shocks will inevitably occur, and so it is also
important that the government foster a resilient financial infrastructure which can
withstand volatility in financial market prices without amplifying the shocks to the
real economy.  This requires attention to the micro-economic structure of financial
institutions and markets (Santomero (1991a)). 
III.B. Why Depository Institutions Warrant Official Oversight
Depository institutions are structurally vulnerable because they finance
holdings of imperfectly marketable direct claims with short-term liabilities which
they promise to redeem at par.  In addition, they provide the valuable service of
maturity transformation which is mutually beneficial to borrowers and savers but
which may, nonetheless, place the depository institution in jeopardy.  
3
As we have seen imperfect marketability is likely to be a fundamental
characteristic of most of the direct claims held by depository institutions.   The
4
imperfect marketability of most of the direct claims held by depository institutions
means that the market does not provide direct information about the value of a
depository institution's assets.  And so, holders of indirect claims (depositors)
cannot readily evaluate the solvency of a depository institution to affirm that the
market value of its assets exceeds the promised value of its deposit liabilities.  19
Depositors place funds in these institutions fully expecting to be able to
withdraw their deposits whenever they choose.  Frequently their horizon of
investment is uncertain and cannot be clearly established at the outset.
Accordingly, the financial institution is left in the awkward position of investing
in long-term, imperfectly marketable assets funded by deposits with a perceived
short, but uncertain maturity.  If deposit withdrawals are random (as they are likely
to be at a large depository institution) they may be statistically predictable.  But if
depositors become concerned about the solvency of the depository institution,
withdrawals may become systematic and jeopardize the liquidity and solvency of
the depository institution.
Indeed, the managers of an institution which holds imperfectly marketable
assets may wish to exercise control over information critical to estimating the value
of their assets, and they may be tempted to conceal information regarding a
deterioration in value.  They may hope that delaying the release of information will
give their assets time to recover value and thus avert giving depositors an incentive
to run.
Depositors, of course, are aware that the depository institution's managers
have both the incentive and capacity to conceal a decline in the value of its
imperfectly marketable direct claims.  They are also aware that depository
institutions are usually highly leveraged, so that a relatively small percentage
decline in the value of the depository's direct claims results in a much larger
percentage decline in its net worth.  Hence, if bad news casts doubt on the value
of a depository institution's direct claims, creditors may abruptly reduce their
estimate of the depository institution's net worth despite assertions by the
depository institution's managers that the firm is solvent.20
      See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for a model in which rational depositors may participate
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in a bank run caused by a shift in expectations, which could depend on almost anything, "a
bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative government
forecast, or even sunspots."
If depositors could not demand immediate repayment of their claims at par,
the depository institution need not be seriously damaged by the loss of confidence
of its creditors.   With time to make a convincing case, the depository institution
might be able to persuade depositors that its net worth is truly positive.  Even if it
cannot, a solvent depository institution can liquidate direct claims without suffering
loss if it can take time to search for the buyers who are willing to pay the highest
price.  But if depositors can present their claims for immediate redemption at par,
they may force the depository institution to make a hurried liquidation of
imperfectly marketable direct claims at a loss.  Or they may force the depository
institution to borrow at rates sharply higher than it customarily pays or to call in
loans before the borrower's investment matures.
Runs, once begun, tend to be self-reinforcing.  News that the depository
institution is selling direct claims at distressed prices or is borrowing at very high
rates will further undermine the confidence of current and potential depositors.
Even those who believe that, with sufficient time, the depository institution would
be able to redeem all its liabilities, have a motive to join the run.  They have reason
to fear that the costs from the hurried liquidation of direct claims in response to the
run by other creditors might render the depository institution insolvent.   
5
Sophisticated depositors know that illiquidity losses tend to get larger as the
run goes on because the most marketable direct claims are sold first.  They also
know that as a depository institution's net worth approaches zero, the depository
institution's managers may be tempted to take increasingly desperate gambles to21
      Benston and Kaufman (1986) have analyzed this source of contagion and find only
6
limited evidence that it was a cause of financial crises.
stay in business (Herring and Vankudre (1987)).  Thus the perception of possible
insolvency resulting from a decline in asset quality, whether true or not, can
become a self-fulfilling prophecy by inducing creditors to take actions which erode
the depository institution's net worth.
This vulnerability to runs is more than the strictly private concern of an
individual depository institution and its customers.  It becomes a public policy
concern when a loss of confidence in the solvency of one depository institution
may lead to a contagious loss of confidence in other depository institutions.
Contagion may occur through three channels:  (1) depository institutions lose
reserves because cash drains from failing depository institutions are not
redeposited in the depository institution system; (2) depository institutions have or
are suspected to have claims against failing depository institutions; and (3)
depositors at other depository institutions suspect that their depository institutions
are exposed to the same shocks as the failing depository institution.
When cash is withdrawn from a failing depository institution, and it is not
redeposited elsewhere in the banking system, then other depository institutions face
liquidity problems.  This source of contagion can be neutralized, however, if the
monetary authorities take quick action to replenish the general level of depository
institution reserves.  Because most modern monetary authorities acknowledge their
responsibility to control bank reserves, we regard this source of contagion as of
historical interest only.
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On the other hand, contagion may arise if depository institutions have claims
on a failed depository institution that are large relative to the capital of the creditor22
      Just before the run on Continental Illinois National Bank, on April 30, 1984, 66 banks had
7
exposures to Continental in excess of their capital and another 113 had exposures amounting
to between 50% and 100% of their capital.  See appendix to Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs (1984).
depository institution.  This danger is particularly acute in the payments clearing
system in some countries where intra-day extensions of interbank credits are
sometimes very large relative to the settling depository institution's capital
(Humphrey (1986)).
7
This potential for contagion in the interbank market is heightened by the lack
of timely data on interbank exposures (which are netted out of our flow of funds
example above).  When one  depository institution gets into trouble, it is often very
difficult for another depository institution to determine its own aggregate exposure
to this depository institution, let alone the exposures to this institution of other
institutions on which it may hold claims.  Nonbank creditors do not have access to
timely information.  Hence, any existing concerns about a particular institution's
solvency would be heightened if another institution were to fail and it was
suspected that the two institutions had substantial interbank dealings (Faulhaber,
Phillips and Santomero (1989), Guttentag and Herring (1985, 1986b, & 1987), and
Herring (1985)).  
Finally, a failure may also be contagious if other depository institutions are
believed to have positions similar to the failing depository institution and therefore
to have been weakened by the same economic disturbances.  This is a particularly
serious problem when a large depository institution fails.  The larger the depository
institution, the greater the likelihood that its failure will attract public attention and
undermine confidence in the banking system in general, and in similar large
depository institutions in particular.  Moreover, failures of large depository23
      Saunders (1987) summarizes the literature and concludes that there is little evidence of
8
contagion in the post-war era.
      For a discussion of the social costs of bank failures highlighting the impact on
9
transactions balances, borrowers and the payments system see Guttentag and Herring (1987).
institutions are usually attributable to economic disturbances which affect the value
of large categories of assets rather than to embezzlement or other idiosyncratic
causes.  Since large depository institutions compete in the same national and
international markets, they face generally similar cost and demand conditions and
tend to have similar portfolios (Mayer 1975)).
While the potential for contagion is clear, it does not necessarily follow that
contagion has been a significant factor in financial crises--especially in recent
years.   The financial safety net, an elaborate set of institutional mechanisms for
8
protecting the banking system, has largely succeeded in preventing contagious
depository institution runs.  The reason for having such a safety net is the concern
for contagion described above.
III.C. The Role of the Safety Net 
In order to avert the contagious transmission of shocks from one depository
institution to another that might cause a financial crisis,  most countries have
9
developed a financial safety net that prevents the amplification of shocks through
the banking system.  The safety net can be viewed as a set of preventive measures
that are triggered at various stages in the evolution of a financial crisis, as
illustrated in Figure 2 (Guttentag and Herring (1989).
The earliest stage of a financial crisis involves a depository institution
becoming increasingly exposed to a shock which could jeopardize its solvency.
This may occur because adverse changes in the economy have increased theFigure 224
      A more insidious possibility is that favorable economic conditions may lead the
10
depository institution's managers to underestimate the probability of a shock so that excessive
insolvency exposure is assumed unwittingly (Guttentag and Herring (1984, 1986a).
probability of a shock or because the depository institution's managers have made
conscious decisions to accept greater risk, or because the depository institution's
capital position has declined.   
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If the occurrence of a shock causes creditors to question the solvency of a
depository institution, a run may occur which can lead to the contagious
transmission of liquidity problems, and perhaps solvency problems, through the
banking system as discussed in the preceding section.  This chain of events
(sketched in the central column of Table 6) has motivated the construction of the
financial safety net.  The circuit breakers that comprise the safety net are designed
to stop this sequence of events at a number of points, and preserve the integrity of
the financial structure and the health of the real economy.  The components of the
safety net are best described in terms of functions because the agencies which
perform a particular function vary across countries and some functions are shared
among agencies within a particular country.  
 The Chartering Function may screen out imprudent, incompetent or
dishonest institution managers who would be likely to take on
excessive insolvency exposure.
 In the event that some depository institution managers do attempt
to expose their depository institutions to shocks that could jeopardize
their solvency, the Prudential Supervision Function may prevent it.
 In the event that prudential supervision does not prevent a
depository institution from assuming excessive insolvency exposure
and a damaging shock occurs, the Termination Authority may25
      The "termination" of a bank means that the authorities have ended control of the bank by
11
the existing management.  Termination may involve merging the bank with another,
liquidating it, operating it under new management acceptable to the authorities, or some
combination of these actions.  For a further discussion, see Guttentag and Herring (1982).
terminate  the depository institution before it becomes insolvent and
11
causes loss to depositors.
 Even if the Termination Authority acts too late to prevent loss to
depositors, the explicit or implicit Deposit Insurance function
provided by official or private sources may prevent depositors from
running.
 Even if the depository institution closes abruptly, Deposit Insurance
may prevent contagion by sustaining the confidence of depositors at
other depository institutions which are thought to be similar.
 Even if runs occur at other depository institutions, the Lender of
Last Resort Function may enable solvent institutions to meet the
claims of depositors, avoiding forced asset liquidations and depressed
prices.
 Even if other failures occur, the Monetary Authority may prevent a
shift in the public's demand for cash from reducing the volume of
reserves available to the banking system as a whole, thereby confining
the damage to the depository institutions affected directly by the
original shock.
In the major industrialized countries, the various circuit breakers that
comprise financial safety nets have been generally successful in preventing a
problem at one depository institution from damaging the system as a whole.  In the
United States, for example, the safety net which was constructed in the 1930s has
virtually eliminated the contagious transmission of shocks from one depository
institution to the rest of the system.26
However, in an important sense the safety net has been too successful.
Because depositors are confident they will be protected against loss, they have less
incentive to monitor and discipline the behavior of depository institutions.  And
depository institution managers find that since depositors do not demand greater
compensation when depository institutions take greater risks, they can increase
expected returns to their shareholders by assuming riskier positions.  This is
illustrated in Figure 2 by the moral hazard feedback effect of the safety net on
incentives to assume excessive insolvency exposure.  
III.D. Why Financial Markets Warrant Official Oversight
As we have seen in section II, financial markets -- including money markets,
fixed-income, equity, futures and options markets -- also play an important role in
enhancing the efficiency of the economy.  The financial markets provide risk-
pooling and risk-sharing opportunities for both households and firms and facilitate
specialization in production activities in line with the comparative advantage of
each participant in the economy.  
Financial markets also provide a crucial source of information that helps
coordinate decentralized decisions throughout the economy.  Interest rates and
equity prices are used by households in allocating income between consumption
and savings and in allocating their stock of wealth.  Firms also rely on financial
markets for information about which investment projects to select and how such
projects should be financed (Merton (1989)).  
A serious disruption or dysfunction in financial markets which causes prices
to diverge from fundamental values and participants to withdraw from the markets
can have damaging impacts on economic welfare.  Thus the overall objective of
government with regard to financial markets should be to ensure that they perform27
efficiently in helping to allocate, transfer, and deploy economic resources across
time and space in an uncertain environment (Merton (1990)).  This may entail
promoting competition, ensuring the integrity of both financial contracts and
information, and maintaining the public good of confidence in the financial system.
With regard to primary markets, the authorities attempt to create an
environment in which risks are understood, information is fairly and accurately
presented on a timely basis, transactions costs are as low as possible, funds are
allocated to users with the highest, risk-adjusted returns, and credit risk is priced
rather than quantity-rationed to the maximum extent possible.  With regard to
secondary markets and markets in derivative instruments, the authorities attempt
to foster liquid markets which are broad, deep, and resilient.  Liquid secondary
markets reduce the cost of issues in the primary markets and augment the
availability of long-term finance for real investment.  Confidence that primary
claims can be sold at any time in broad, deep secondary markets or hedged in
derivative markets, increases the willingness of investors to buy primary issues of
long-term securities.  When that confidence is undermined, costs of new issues rise
and quantity-rationing increases in primary markets thus reducing real investment.
These objectives with regard to primary, secondary and derivative markets may be
advanced through a variety of means.
III.E. Policies to Enhance the Efficiency of Financial Markets.
III.E.1. Capital Requirements and the Transmission of Shocks
In the preceding section we emphasized one particular rationale for
regulating depository institutions -- the possibility that a liquidity shock could
become contagious and damage the banking system.  Fundamentally this was a
concern over the possibility of damaging externalities:  potentially important social28
costs that no individual depositor or depository institution  could be expected to
take into account in making decisions.  Does this rationale for regulatory
intervention apply to non-depository institutions which participate in financial
markets? 
Large securities houses which take positions in financial assets are subject
to some of the same perceived interconnections that can lead to a contagious loss
of confidence in depository institutions.  If a large securities house fails, other
securities houses have or may be suspected to have claims against the failed firm.
Moreover, customers may suspect that their own security house is exposed to the
same shock which caused the initial firm to fail.  
Securities houses do, however, differ from depository institutions in four
important respects.  First, customer funds will normally be strictly segregated from
the institution's own assets.  Thus, although the failure of a securities house may
inflict a loss on the creditors of the firm, it will not impose a loss on customers.
Second, investment managers do not offer debt contracts that guarantee particular
rates of return, so customers have no incentive to scramble to be first in line to
redeem claims.  Third, the portfolio of a securities house normally consists of
marketable securities which can be easily evaluated and transferred to other firms
with minimal disruptions to customers in the event of failure.  Fourth, in many
countries the financial markets play a much less central role in the functioning of
the real economy than does the banking system and so the possible damage to
economic activity is less worrisome.
Nonetheless, regulators in many countries impose capital requirements on
securities firms which vary directly with the open positions in financial claims
assumed by securities firms.  The rationale is that in the event of a shock,29
      When the group failed the anticipated flight to quality in the government securities
12
market was slight and quickly reversed and the Dow Jones average actually finished the day
above the previous close.  
institutions should be sufficiently well-capitalized so that confidence in the
efficient functioning of markets will not be undermined by doubts about the
solvency of important market participants.
Although the sharp drop in securities prices during October 19, 1987 spread
with alarming rapidity across national securities markets, few securities houses
failed, and none of the failures was large enough to jeopardize other firms
(Loehnis, 1990).  Moreover, in 1990 when a major securities house, the Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.,  collapsed, disruptions to the market were
minimal.  This may, of course, be evidence that the regulatory authorities and
12
market participants intervened adroitly to prevent a crisis or that the capital
requirements and other regulations in place were adequate to absorb even the
extraordinary shocks to the securities markets experienced during October 1987.
But it may also indicate that the contagious transmission of shocks among
securities houses is a less serious concern than the contagious transmission of
shocks among depository institutions. 
III.E.2. The Integrity of Clearing and Settlement Arrangements
The possibility that a counterparty may fail before a transaction is settled
means that participants must not only value the security they wish to buy, but also
the creditworthiness of the counterparty and the reliability of the clearing and
settlement mechanism.  Concern over the integrity of the clearing and settlement
process can distort the prices of securities and disrupt the flows of funds (Herring
(1991c)).30
Governments clearly have an interest in maintaining the integrity of both
domestic and foreign clearing and settlement systems.  They can clearly play a
useful role in improving the clearing and settlements mechanism, as did the US
government, for example when it developed the book-entry system for clearing and
settling US government securities.  However, it should be noted that a private
organization, The Group of Thirty, has taken the lead in pressing for improvements
in the clearing and settlement process in national securities markets.  The Group
of Thirty has urged that private exchanges and governments reduce the time for
matching and settlement of trades.  The ultimate aim is the establishment of
delivery-against-payment systems for settling financial transactions and the use of
depositories, netting mechanisms and standardized numbering systems to facilitate
international transfers. This is clearly an area where the interests of governments
and market participants overlap.
III.E.3. Protection of Customers from Better-Informed Securities Firms
Central to the efficient operation of the financial markets is confidence in the
financial information on which decisions are made.  Confidence that financial
markets operate according to rules and procedures that are fair, transparent and
place the interests of investors first is a public good.  It increases flows through
financial markets and the effectiveness with which financial markets allocate
resources across time and space.  However, this public good is likely to be
underproduced because the private return to securities firms which adhere to strict
codes of conduct is likely to be less than the social return.  Unethical firms may be
able to ride free on the reputation established by ethical firms and take advantage
of the relative ignorance of clients in order to boost profits.31
The problem arises from the fact that customers -- particularly small
customers -- find it very difficult to evaluate the quality of financial information
and services provided to them for their investment decisions.  Indeed, even after
the decision is made and financial results are announced, it is difficult to determine
whether an unfavorable outcome was the result of bad luck, even though good
advice was competently and honestly rendered, or the result of incompetence or
dishonesty.  Because it is so difficult to evaluate the quality of many financial
services, customers are vulnerable to both adverse selection and moral hazard.  The
first, adverse selection, is the possibility that they will choose an incompetent or
dishonest firm for investment or agent for execution of a transaction.  The second,
moral hazard, is the possibility that firms or agents will put their own 
interests or interests of another customer above those of the customer or even
engage in fraud.  In short, uninformed customers are vulnerable to incompetence,
negligence, and fraud.  
The expectation of repetitive transactions with a client will give owners of
some firms reason to be concerned with their reputations.  This will reduce the
risks to uninformed customers of adverse selection or moral hazard except when
the expected gain from taking advantage of a client is very large or when the
interests of a firm's employees differ from those of the owners.  But primary
reliance on a firm's concern with its reputation is not an entirely satisfactory
solution to the problem of asymmetric information.   Since it takes time to build a
reputation for honest dealing, primary reliance on reputation to establish the quality
of securities firms tends to restrict entry into the securities business.  This may
result in higher transactions costs than would prevail in a perfectly competitive
market. For this reason it may be useful for regulators to establish "fit and proper32
tests" to provide an alternative way for securities firms to affirm their quality ex
ante.  
Ex post, strict enforcement of codes of conduct with civil and criminal
sanctions will help maintain confidence in securities markets, instruments and
firms.  It also provides securities firms with incentives to adopt administrative
procedures that ensure that clients are competently and honestly served and that
employees will behave in a way that upholds the firms' reputation.  
III.E.4. Protection of Investors from Better-Informed Issuers of  Securities
Investors are often at an informational disadvantage with respect to issuers
of securities.  This too is a disadvantage that varies with the resources of the
investor.  Very large investors often have the leverage to compel an issuer to
disclose relevant data and the expertise to analyze such data.  Small investors may
lack both the leverage and the expertise.  For this reason it may be useful to
standardize accounting practices, require the  regular disclosure of data relevant to
a firm's financial prospects and encourage the development of rating agencies
which enable even small investors to take advantage of economies of scale in
gathering and analyzing data.
In most developed countries there has been a pronounced trend toward the
institutionalization of savings:  more and more money is being managed by fewer
and fewer decisionmakers.  Individuals increasingly place their savings with
insurance companies, pension funds, or mutual funds rather than dealing directly
in markets themselves.  Because large institutions have the resources and
incentives to monitor securities firms and issuers carefully, problems associated
with asymmetries in information are, perhaps, less important than they once were.
Nonetheless, confidence in the integrity of financial markets -- confidence that33
relevant information is available to all investors in a timely fashion and that
securities houses place the interests of their customers first -- is an important asset
to a domestic financial market in the world competition for funds.
III.F. Accommodating Socially Useful Financial Innovations
Advances in computer hardware and software, telecommunications, and
financial theory have led to a rapid increase in the pace of financial innovation.
Such change can be viewed as the result of attempts by the private sector to
respond to opportunities that exist in the marketplace.  Altman (1987), Jensen
(1988), Merton (1989), Santomero (1989) and others have identified several forces
driving the innovation process.  First, innovations have responded to market
demands for risk-sharing, risk-pooling, hedging and intertemporal or spatial
transfers of resources that are not currently available.  Second, innovations have
satisfied continuing needs for lower transactions costs or increased liquidity.  
Third, innovations have reduced asymmetric information between trading parties
and improved the monitoring of the performance of principals by agents. Fourth,
innovations have enhanced the ability of investors to influence the allocation and
disposition of corporate assets.  Fifth, innovations have facilitated the avoidance
of taxes, regulatory and accounting constraints.
These forces have led to a decade of financial innovation unparalleled in the
postwar era.  Some corporate managers have argued that many of these innovations
have constrained their ability to operate in the best interests of long-term investors.
They blame these innovations for hostile takeovers, greenmail, excessive levels of
debt, and pressures to maximize reported short-term income to the detriment of
more productive long-term investments.  Still others have argued that many of
these financial transactions are driven exclusively by asymmetries in the tax codes
which favor debt over equity.34
On the other hand, active investors in these markets see substantial benefits.
They believe such innovations provide greater opportunities for entrepreneurs to
obtain capital and offer a mechanism to insure that entrenched corporate managers
are more accountable to shareholders.  They view innovative instruments such as
junk bonds, warrants, poison-puts and equity kickers as a way to expand the capital
resources available to support efficient managers and to discipline ineffective
managers.  
Those opposed to these innovations have often proposed regulations to
prohibit them arguing that their costs to society outweigh their benefits.  Yet many
of these innovations have had positive effects on the economy (Jensen 1989).  They
have, undoubtedly, increased the extent to which entrepreneurs have been able to
raise capital and made corporate managers more accountable to investors; however,
excesses have occurred.  Regulatory attempts to constrain innovations should be
made with extreme caution.  To the extent that these innovations are a 
response to demands to markets (factors one through four above), attempts to
prohibit innovations may simply cause the innovations to move offshore.
Domestic firms and consequently the growth of the real sector may suffer.  
To the extent that these innovations are a response to the fifth factor --
distortions in the national regulatory, tax or accounting system -- the best response
is to correct the distortions.  But if that is not feasible, such innovations may be a
second best solution. Although some innovations waste resources and diminish
social welfare, this is not inevitably the case.  When regulatory constraints are
inefficient (see the next section, for some examples), even innovations motivated
by the fifth factor may enhance the efficiency of the economy.  35
Entrepreneurs generally introduce financial innovations; but, in some
important instances, governments have successfully taken an active role in the
innovation process.  For example, the US government played a leading part in
securitizing mortgages so that what had been a very segmented set of local markets
became a highly integrated national market.  And the United Kingdom made an
important contribution to the array of investment opportunities by issuing indexed
bonds, thus providing investors with a hedge against the risk of general inflation
which no private party could credibly supply.  This role of government within the
financial system is often neglected, but it offers important potential benefits.
Encouragement of financial innovations can add substantial value to both the
financial sector and to the broader economy.
In addition to protecting retail customers and occasionally introducing
financial innovations, the government may need to play a role in slowing the speed
with which innovations are introduced in order to assure the integrity of the market.
The potential problem stems from the fact that innovations are introduced as soon
as they are privately profitable, without regard for their potential impact on the
financial infrastructure.  This can be yet another variant of the public goods
problem:  although it is in everyone's interest to have a secure, reliable financial
infrastructure, the entrepreneur who introduces a financial innovation will usually
lack an incentive to consider the potential impact of the innovation on the financial
infrastructure.  
It is as if an inventor discovers a new, super-powerful truck which can carry
ten times the load of normal trucks at much lower per unit cost.  The invention is
enormously profitable to the inventor; but, the super-powerful truck is very close
to the weight limit of the bridge which connects two major cities.  The inventor36
      In the world of financial innovations, the introduction of a copycat innovation is likely to
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happen very rapidly because financial innovations cannot be patented.
does not have an incentive to take this factor into account; but, when a competitor
introduces a similar, super-powerful truck  and the two trucks cross the bridge at
13
the same time, the bridge may collapse causing loss not only to the owners of the
innovative new products, but also to the vital flow of normal traffic.  The role of
government in preventing such catastrophes is very important; but, it requires a
careful balancing of safety against efficiency.  The easy solution for government
is to ban all trucks above a certain weight limit.  Indeed, in the short-run this may
be the only workable remedy.  But, if the invention offers sufficient efficiency
gains, the government should also invest in improving the infrastructure to
accommodate the innovation.  Limits may occasionally, be necessary; but, they
should be transient (Merton, 1990).
IV. Excessive Regulation and Regulatory Avoidance
In the preceding section we made a case that regulation and supervision can
enhance the efficiency of the financial system.  But it would be misleading and
naive to end the discussion at that point.  Not all regulation enhances efficiency.
Indeed, many regulations both reduce the current level of efficiency in the financial
sector and inhibit the ability of the financial system to adapt to the changing needs
of borrowers and investors.
Government regulation may impose many different kinds of costs on the
financial system.  These costs must be clearly recognized and weighed to provide
a balanced assessment of regulatory policy.
These include:  
1. Direct costs such as fees, reserve requirements, and taxes; 37
2. Distortions of market prices that are the result of regulations
which cause misallocations of economic resources; 
3. Regulations which cause uncompensated transfers of wealth
between private transactors;  and 
4. Transfers of wealth from taxpayers to participants in financial
markets through underpriced official guarantees.
The first of these costs is perhaps the most obvious.  Costs which result from
Central Bank or Treasury action have direct transfer effects from the industry to the
government sector (although the cost may be passed on to users of financial
services).  The high reserve requirements on demand deposits in Italy which do not
bear a market rate of interest, are an example.  The transfer tax in Sweden, which
has been repealed, is another.  
The second type of cost arises when market signals are distorted by the
presence of regulation.  Mandated coverage by insurance providers, uniform
pricing of different actuarial risks and transfer taxes on both real and financial
property all cause the market price of the affected good to misrepresent real
economic value.  This reduces the demand for the "taxed" product and distorts the
market share of the institutions supplying the product.  Arguments couched in
terms of "a level playing field" usually center on the distortionary effect of various
types of regulation and the implications for competitiveness and market share.  
The third cost of regulation centers on intersectoral effects.  To the extent
that regulation favors one sector over another, a comprehensive evaluation of such
regulation should include the impact of this transfer on social welfare.  Examples
of intersectoral transfers are deposit rate ceilings, and usury ceilings.  When these
ceilings are binding, regulation obliges one sector to subsidize another.  This38
causes direct wealth transfers and may also create distortions in the allocation of
resources.
Finally, some regulations work to the advantage of market participants at the
potential expense of taxpayers.  If regulators offer subsidies or guarantees, such as
deposit, institutional or clearing guarantees, the industry and its users become
direct beneficiaries.
In each case these inefficiencies or costs distort market signals, hinder
competition and cause uncompensated transfers of wealth.  At times some industry
members prosper because of regulatory intervention; at times they are hurt.  Yet,
these costs are a central feature of any regulatory structure, whether it is applied
to institutions within the markets or the market instruments themselves. 
IV.A. Inefficient Regulation of Financial Institutions
Clumsily applied, any of the regulatory interventions we described in the
preceding section, can produce dysfunctional results and undermine the
performance, competitive position or even viability of financial institutions.  For
example, if the chartering function is used to restrict entry, it protects the profits
of those currently holding charters and increases the cost of financial services
beyond that which can be justified by the opportunity costs of the resources
employed.  This, in effect, transfers wealth from users of financial services to
financial institutions.  Moreover, because they are protected from new entrants,
financial institutions are likely to be less innovative in serving the changing needs
of their customers.  This may result in a lower capital stock and a lower standard
of living in the economy.  
Similarly, supervisory action may place restrictions on the kinds of assets
which financial institutions are permitted to hold.  For example, financial39
institutions may be required to hold assets which they would otherwise avoid
holding or they may be prohibited from holding assets which they would prefer.
Overly restrictive enforcement of policies may also reduce the flow of risk capital
to the real sector and reduce overall investment.  In each case, the allocation of
capital will be distorted relative to the competitive equilibrium and the economy
may be less productive than it could be.  Supervision may also impose heavy direct
costs on financial institutions in terms of auditing costs, filing requirements and
examination fees.  These side effects of regulation may reduce overall efficiency
and cause regulated institutions to lose market share.  Excessive regulation can and
has rendered some financial services completely uneconomical in some
jurisdictions.  
Termination policy may also have costs.  Delays in terminating decapitalized
institutions may result in a misallocation of funds, as desperate managers take
increasingly risky gambles in order to prevent closure.  Because shareholders are
protected by limited liability they may perceive high-risk activities as their only
hope of salvation.  If depositors and other creditors believe they are protected by
official guarantees, they may lack incentive to monitor and discipline the
institution's risk-taking.  
Likewise, ineptly administered deposit insurance may distort incentives for
risk-taking by financial institutions and may resort in enormous transfers of wealth
from conservatively managed institutions to risky institutions and potentially, from
taxpayers to creditors of financial institutions.  The thrift crisis in the United States
provides dramatic evidence of the enormous potential costs of under-priced, risk-
blind deposit insurance and failing to close insured institutions when they become
insolvent.  40
The provision of lender-of-last resort assistance to insolvent institutions also
has potential costs.  This activity may undercut what would otherwise be a
favorable signal to the market, thus weakening the ability of the regulatory
authority to deal with systemic shocks.  It may also permit incompetently managed
or excessively risky institutions to continue misallocating funds long after they
would have been forced to close by market forces.  And perhaps worst of all it may
lead to expectations of future bailouts and intensify political pressures for such
bailouts.  This may be the legacy of current events in Norway.
Finally, monetary control through refinancing, central bank advances or
reserve requirements which do not bear a market rate of interest can impose a
significant tax on depository institutions.  The central bank may impede an
institution's ability to provide useful intermediary services to the real sector.  Such
regulations distort the allocation of scarce savings in the economy.  Some users of
financial services may switch to less efficient vendors which are not subject to
reserve requirements or similar implicit taxes; others may be unable to afford
financial services which would enhance their productivity and welfare if banks
were less heavily taxed.
IV.B Inefficient Regulation of Securities Markets
Ineptly applied regulations may also produce perverse results with regard to
securities markets.  Capital requirements may be larger than necessary to prevent
systemic contagion and may serve as a barrier to entry which raises costs to users
of financial services and generates super-normal profits for large firms.  Similarly,
fit and proper tests may be employed to limit competition rather than to give
assurances that all competitors are competent to perform services offered.  Codes
of conduct may be useful in protecting unsophisticated customers, but excessive41
monitoring and compliance costs may raise costs to users of financial services
unnecessarily.  Finally, attempts to control the pace of financial innovation in order
to prevent a breakdown in the financial infrastructure, may stifle entrepreneurial
initiative and cause innovative products to shift off-shore. 
The costs of inefficient regulation are obviously of concern to providers of
financial services; but, they should also be of concern to users of financial services
and the public at large.  Excessive regulatory costs may destroy the very markets
they are intended to safeguard.  Investors will face a truncated menu of assets,
firms may be unable to obtain cost-effective financing and investment may
diminish, thereby reducing a country's economic growth and undermining its
international competitiveness.
IV.C. Regulatory Avoidance 
It is relatively easy to cite historical examples of each kind of cost associated
with inefficient regulation.  Yet, reductions in the cost of transportation,
telecommunications (Figure 3) and computation are rapidly diminishing the scope
for regulators to impose burdensome regulations.  This has occurred in two ways.
First, new technology has permitted the unbundling and repackaging of individual
products in a variety of ways.  Thus regulations which prohibit one kind of activity
can easily be circumvented by product redesign or repackaging to produce a close
substitute.  Examples of this phenomenon include Eurodollar deposits, off-shore
banking facilities and money market mutual funds. 
Second, technology has made geographic boundaries virtually obsolete.
Institutions can easily avoid onerous regulation by moving the locus of the activity
to a more congenial regulatory domain.  International competition among national42
      For example, in the middle ages, the King of France tried to attract commercial and
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financial business to Lyons by forbidding merchants to travel to rival Geneva.
regulatory authorities is a long-standing tradition ;  it has become more intense as
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the costs of traversing time and space have fallen.  In an important sense, the
introduction of personal computers, modems and international direct-dial telephone
systems have marked the beginning of the end of autonomous national financial
regulation. Unless a government chooses to impose draconian controls on cross-
border flows of information and people, closer integration between the domestic
and world financial system is technologically inevitable.
Heightened global competition exposes differences in national regulatory
structures to an exacting market test.  Indeed, as telecommunications costs decline,
international competition may ultimately become so intense that national
regulatory authorities can only expect to retain the minimum level of regulation
necessary to provide adequate consumer protection and assure the safety and
soundness of the financial system.  Regulatory policies designed to accomplish
other objectives such as the redistribution of wealth from one sector of the
economy to another or from one class of institutions to another will become
increasingly untenable as users of financial services turn to foreign sources of
supply whenever domestic financial products are not competitively priced.
Recent decades have provided numerous instances of regulatory initiatives
which have been more effective in shifting the location of financial activity than
in accomplishing the objective which the regulation was intended to achieve.  For
example, the attempt by the United States to impose an Interest Equalization Tax
to discourage foreign borrowing in dollar capital markets, led to the creation of43
active market in dollar-denominated bonds -- the Eurobond market -- outside the
regulatory domain of the United States. 
Similarly, during the 1960s and 1970s, each time interest rate ceilings on
deposits in the US became binding, an enormous volume of dollar deposits shifted
from the US to Eurodollar centers.  When US bank customers found they could not
roll-over their Certificates of Deposit in US banks at the market rate of interest,
they simply transferred their deposits to Eurobanks -- often shell branches of their
American banks -- but, located beyond the reach of interest-rate ceiling regulations.
Examples of this phenomenon are easy to find throughout Europe.  In 1988
approximately $10.7 billion of German investment funds flowed into the
Luxembourg bond market following the announced imposition of a German 10%
withholding tax to be made effective January 1989.  Likewise, the establishment
of organized markets for derivative instruments has been so inhibited in Germany
by the interpretation of gambling laws that most futures trading in German
government bonds has taken place in London.  Similarly the imposition of a
transfer tax in the Swedish market caused market activity to relocate in London.
The tax mainly succeeded in relocating market activity rather than in raising
revenue for the government or dampening volatility in market prices.
IV.D. Regulatory Competition
In several important financial centers the regulatory authorities have reacted
to competitive pressures by relaxing regulations covering both financial markets
and depository institutions.  Indeed, some countries have taken active measures to
attract a larger share of international business by improving the infrastructure to
support financial services and by virtually eliminating regulatory burdens on
international financial transactions (Kane (1987)).  In addition, several countries --44
most notably Canada, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom -- have
relaxed traditional restrictions on the permissible scope of operations of domestic
depository institutions to permit them greater flexibility in responding to changing
market conditions (Bröker (1989)).  
Regulatory competition has recently intensified because of the European
Community's bold initiative to enhance the efficiency of financial regulation within
the Community (Herring (1991)).  The speed with which the European Community
has agreed to a fundamental and thoroughgoing reform of its regulatory framework
is remarkable from an American perspective, where until the recent Treasury
initiative, regulatory reform has been the result of persistent litigation and creative
administrative interpretations. The Second Banking Directive, approved in
December 1989 by the European Parliament, insures that European institutions can
choose to become universal banks.  European banks will be permitted to accept
deposits, make long-term loans, issue and underwrite corporate securities and take
equity positions.  The Community's approach to harmonization of banking
regulation among the member states, which combines the adoption of a single
banking license with the principles of mutual recognition and home country
control, will create a competitive dynamic which makes it likely that the European
regulatory system will remain flexible and efficient (Key (1989)). 
The freedom European financial institutions will have to select from
regulatory regimes in any of the current twelve member countries for providing
financial services throughout the European Community will cause each national
regulatory authority to assess carefully the competitive impact of its regulatory
structure.  The approach deliberately encourages national regulatory authorities to
compete, subject to basic safety and soundness constraints, in providing the most45
efficient regulatory system.  As Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the
Commission of the European Communities has observed, the Community "in one
bound...has moved from twelve fragmented and confusing structures of national
(banking) regulation to a single market of a size and simplicity unmatched
anywhere else in the world."  He emphasized that the motive was not "merely to
benefit banks...[but]...to increase the competitiveness of European industry by
giving it access to the cheapest, most efficient, and most innovative financial
products in the world," (Brittan (1990)).
Among major industrial countries, only the United States and Japan still
insist on a sharp distinction between commercial and investment banking activities
in their home markets.  Japan appears to be moving with deliberate speed to
dismantle many of the regulations that segment its financial system (Corrigan
(1990)).  And the US Treasury has recently unveiled a plan to rationalize the US
financial system -- partly in response to a perception of the declining competitive
position of US banks, but also because of mounting evidence that the current
system is ineffective and unacceptedly expensive.
IV.E. International Harmonization of Regulation
In response to increasing competition among national regulatory authorities,
attempts have been made to harmonize regulation and supervision of
internationally active banks.  These efforts date from the first meetings of the
Committee of Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices which was formed
under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in the wake of the
Herstatt crisis in the mid-seventies.  The first accomplishment of the BIS
Committee was to agree to a Concordat (Blunden (1977)) which set out principles
to guide the supervision and regulation of international banks and insure that no46
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the BIS approach and the use of bank capital for regulatory risk reduction purposes.
major bank was able to operate unregulated.  After the collapse of the Banco
Ambrosiano in 1982, the Concordat was revised to eliminate some loopholes in the
supervisory network which the Banco Ambrosiano had skillfully exploited.  The
most important accomplishment of the BIS Committee, however, has been the
recent development of risk-adjusted capital adequacy guidelines (BIS (1988)). 
The supervisory authorities have placed strong emphasis on raising capital
asset ratios for three reasons:  (1) higher ratios provide a larger cushion to absorb
losses and avoid insolvency; (2) higher ratios give shareholders and subordinated
debt holders greater incentives to monitor and control risk; and (3) higher ratios
give the supervisory authorities more time to detect any deterioration in a bank's
condition and to enforce remedial actions before insolvency occurs.  While there
is considerable concern over the exact formulation of these capital standards,  it
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seems clear that the BIS Committee has gone a long way in establishing a model
for global harmonization of financial regulation. 
IV.F. Market Alternatives to Harmonization  
The substantial difficulty in negotiating capital adequacy standards on
financial institutions through a multi-national agreements, suggests that it may be
useful to place greater emphasis on harnessing market forces to help monitor safety
and soundness.  In principle, impersonal market forces, unencumbered by the
complex bargaining that is intrinsic to any international bureaucratic process,
should be able to monitor the insolvency risk of banks more efficiently and
discipline banks which take excessive risks.  In practice two difficulties arise.47
First, depositors and creditors who feel protected by the safety net will lack
incentive to acquire and evaluate the appropriate information.  This leaves only
equity holders with the responsibility for monitoring the riskiness of their
institutions.  Can monitoring by shareholders compensate for slack monitoring by
depositors and creditors?  Shareholders do indeed have a strong interest in
monitoring the expected profitability of banks, but their risk preferences will often
diverge from those of depositors, creditors, and the supervisory authorities.  The
exposure of shareholders to downside risks is limited by their equity stake, but their
potential upside gain includes all returns that exceed the amount promised to
depositors and creditors.  In contrast, depositors and creditors, including the official
institutions which implicitly back-up large institutions, must be concerned about
the possibility of large losses which exceed the equity of shareholders.  Moreover,
they will not benefit from any potentially offsetting large gains.  The upshot is that
shareholders will generally prefer riskier portfolios than creditors, depositors and
the supervisory authorities and this conflict of interest will worsen as the equity
position of shareholders declines.  
In the absence of a financial safety net, creditors and depositors will have an
incentive to monitor managers to make sure that they are not taking risks which
benefit shareholders at their expense.  But if depositors and creditors feel protected
by the financial safety net, shareholders are likely to take greater risks in order to
take advantage of slack monitoring by depositors and creditors.  This is one of the
principal rationales for prudential supervision and official regulation of capital
ratios:  capital adequacy requirements counteract to some extent the pernicious
moral hazard of the safety net.48
Second, many important international banks don't publicly disclose much
information that is pertinent for evaluating safety and soundness.  An indication of
this problem is that in every country, banks disclose much more information to the
banking authorities than to the general public.  And, the limited information they
do disclose is generally not comparable across banks within the country much less
across banks in different countries.  This may be a useful area for public policy
intervention;  but, international harmonization of accounting standards and
disclosure policy would involve most of the difficulties that have impeded
harmonization of meaningful risk-adjusted capital-asset ratios.  It is not clear that
efforts to harmonize disclosure would be more successful.  
Nonetheless, pressure from the BIS Committee to raise capital adequacy
ratios has led indirectly to some improvements in disclosure.  In order to get the
best possible price for new issues of equity and subordinated debt, some banks
have voluntarily disclosed their hidden reserves.  And security analysts continue
to exert pressure for more and better quality disclosure as they attempt to compare
the profitability of firms based in different countries.  Rating agencies are also
becoming an important force for improving disclosure practices as banks attempt
to tap sources of capital outside their domestic markets.  
Market discipline also could be increased by providing incentives for market
participants to exercise closer scrutiny of financial institutions.  The key incentive
is fear of loss.  As noted above, however, the safety net reduces the perceived
vulnerability of creditors to loss.  Changing this perception requires a clear change
in regulatory behavior.  Regulators must abolish the perception of guarantees for
all creditors.  This may be accomplished either by explicitly exempting some49
      The US Treasury proposal for reforming the US financial system and a recent report from
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Morgan Guaranty, for example, both advocate some reinsurance of deposits by private firms.
creditors from the protection of the safety net or requiring private third party
guarantees in addition to existing government support.
Formally withdrawing the safety net and publicly announcing that financial
institutions will no longer benefit from implicit or explicit guarantees, is the
approach taken in New Zealand.  However, such a policy has proven easier to
proclaim than to enforce (Guttentag and Herring (1987) and Herring (1990)).  The
government must be willing to permit a failure and sustain the consequences.  In
the past  governments have found it difficult to follow through on their announced
intentions.  Thus  market participants usually view such official proclamations with
skepticism.  They know too well that political pressure generally triumphs over
principle in time of public crisis.
The second method of instilling discipline is to impose the de jure system of
seniority that already exists between debt and equity, or between senior claims and
subordinate ones.  Here subordination of certain classes of debt provides an
incentive for at least some creditors to monitor performance and impose discipline.
This could be enhanced by requirements that banks issue a certain percentage of
their liabilities as short-term, unsecured debt.  The necessity of rolling-over this
debt at frequent intervals would oblige banks to face the continuing scrutiny of at
least one category of creditors with a strong incentive to monitor insolvency risk
carefully.  
Finally, the regulatory authority may require that banks partially insure their
deposits with private insurance companies.   Although private insurance
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companies could not provide complete, fully credible deposit insurance against50
systemic risks, they could nonetheless reduce vulnerability to systemic problems
by monitoring insolvency risk and setting appropriate risk premiums for the banks
for which they provide reinsurance.  
V. The Gains from an Efficient Financial System
As we observed in earlier sections, an efficient financial system facilitates
the optimal allocation of resources.  When financial institutions and financial
markets are efficient, capital is allocated to the most promising projects which are
expected to offer the highest, risk-adjusted returns.  In addition, a wide array of
financial instruments allows savers and investors to achieve their preferred trade-
off between risk and return.  Confidence in the financial system encourages
investors to allocate their savings through financial markets and institutions rather
than to invest in non-productive assets in order to hedge against inflation or the risk
of financial collapse.  As noted above such confidence requires not only some
regulation, but also sufficient flexibility to adapt to market needs and opportunities.
V.A. Quantification of Efficiency Gains
What is the quantifiable gain to society from a movement to a more efficient
system?  How can this gain be measured?  These questions are important, yet
difficult to address.  They require both an operationally meaningful definition of
efficiency which can be quantified and a practical measure of deviations from the
ideal standard of efficiency.  Efficiency has two dimensions: a static dimension and
a dynamic dimension.  Both are important in any assessment of a change in the
financial structure.  
Static efficiency is achieved when funds move from ultimate savers to
ultimate investors and risks are redistributed and/or hedged at minimal cost.
Therefore, the relative efficiency of any system in static terms can be measured by51
the size of deviations from this minimal cost benchmark.  The gains in efficiency
that may result from alterations in financial structure can be estimated relative to
the least cost producer as a proxy for the potential gain from the movement from
one financial and regulatory structure to another.  
Dynamic efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the flexibility with which
the system adapts to changing market conditions and the needs of customers.
Unlike static efficiency, however, measures of relative or absolute dynamic
efficiency are difficult to define even in principle.
The most ambitious attempt to measure the gains from improving static
efficiency has been undertaken by the European Community.  Their efforts
included commissioned work by Price Waterhouse (Price Waterhouse (1988)) and
subsequent policy analysis by the staff of the Commission (Catinat, Eonnai and
Italianer (1988)).  The European Community studies may be of interest as an
indication of potential value to an economy of a movement toward greater financial
efficiency.  At a minimum it offers evidence of the order of magnitude of the
potential gain.  The EC studies have attempted to measure both the direct and
indirect effects of establishing a single market for financial services in which high-
cost producers of financial services would be displaced by low-cost producers.
Price Waterhouse was commissioned to make an estimate of the direct
benefits associated with this movement toward efficiency.  Their approach was to
measure gains to consumers from presumed price reductions in a basket of 14
financial services that would occur once integration was completed.  They assumed
that, after integration, prices in each country would fall about half way toward the
average prices of the four lowest cost suppliers in the EC.  The remaining price
dispersion was assumed to reflect the idiosyncracies of individual markets (and is52
roughly equivalent to the price dispersion for various financial services in the
integrated US market). These direct benefits of improving the financial structure
across the EC were estimated to be about $25 billion or .7% of the combined 1985
GDP of the twelve member countries.
It should be noted that this measure of consumer gains is not necessarily
equivalent to the net change in overall welfare. It neglects changes in the profits of
producers, changes in the distribution of income and adjustment costs that will
occur in moving from a less efficient to a more efficient financial system.
Moreover, it assumes that competition among suppliers of financial services will
be sufficient to reduce costs to the minimum feasible level.
The EC staff then performed a separate study to measure the indirect benefits
of forming a single market in financial services.  These indirect benefits stem from
potential increases in national product from the lowering of interest rate spreads
and prices for financial services.  The EC study assumed that the price changes
predicted by the Price Waterhouse study would occur within one year and
proceeded to estimate their impact on production through macro-economic
simulations.  The indirect benefits were estimated to be about $55 billion or 1.5%
of the combined GDP of EC member countries in 1985 -- nearly twice the size of
the estimated direct benefits.  Together they represent substantial benefits to the
real economy and an important mechanism to improve the economic well-being of
citizens of the EC.  The sum of the direct and indirect effects of enhancing the
competitiveness of the financial sector -- 2.2% of the combined GDP of EC
member countries in 1985 -- is a very substantial proportion of the total estimated
increase in the Community's economic welfare -- between 4.3% and 6.4% of GDP
-- estimated by the Cecchini report.53
The EC studies did not, however, attempt to quantify dynamic efficiency.
Yet, in the long-run, the gains from a flexible financial system in which financial
instruments and institutions adapt readily to the changing needs of savers and
investors  may be the most important aspect of efficiency.  The benefits from
enhancing the dynamic efficiency of the financial system to enable it to respond
flexibly to changing market demands are likely to be particularly strong in an era
in which macroeconomic volatility and technological change appear to be
increasing.  If the financial sector is not permitted to respond flexibly, real
economic performance will decline.  However, it is extraordinarily difficult to
quantify the gains from improving dynamic efficiency, since it would involve
placing a value on the option to respond flexibly to uncertain future events.
V.B. Potential Benefits from a More Flexible Financial Structure
As financial markets and products change, institutions must also change to
be efficient and competitive.  Thus an evaluation of the efficiency of a nation's
financial structure should also include a recognition of the need for flexibility in
organizational form.  Regulation should allow for such flexibility; it should not
restrict a firm's choice of structure unless a clear public purpose is served.
Firms which transact business within a very rigid organizational structure will be
neither statically nor dynamically efficient.  Thus flexibility of corporate form has
important implications for the efficiency of the financial sector.  
Recently there has been a clear trend toward large firms adopting a
conglomerate structure, to exploit potential efficiencies in the production and
delivery of financial services.  Over the past decade, these large financial
conglomerates have performed not only the traditional intermediary and payments54
      The formation of financial conglomerates may also be motivated by the expectation of
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achieving market power.  We consider this possibility unlikely so long as barriers to entry are
negligible (Herring and Santomero (1990)).
functions of depository institutions but also provided a much broader range of
services often including investment banking services and insurance.   
Firms form such financial conglomerates because owners or managers of
financial firms believe that they can achieve synergies or economies of scope
which will make it more profitable to provide a range of services within an
integrated corporate group than to provide each service through a separately
managed corporation.   These synergies may arise from two distinct sources: the
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production or consumption of financial services.  
Economies of scope in production may be realized whenever the cost of
producing a given mix of products jointly is less than the sum of costs of producing
each product separately (Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Panzar and Willig (1981), and
Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall (1984)).   Economies of scope are likely to be
important whenever a significant fixed cost can be shared across products. Several
factors would appear to give rise to economies of scope in the provision of
financial services.  The fixed costs of managing a client relationship (Steinherr and
Huveneers (1989, p.8)) -- including human resources, information systems, and
establishing and maintaining a sound reputation -- may be shared across a broad
range of financial services.  It may also be possible to use distribution channels
established for one product to distribute other products at slight marginal cost.  In
addition, information used to produce one product may be used to produce other
products at very little additional cost.  More broadly, if the existence or scale of
output of one type of product affects the unit cost of another, then an integrated55
conglomerate firm may produce services at lower marginal cost than an
autonomous, single function firm.  
Recently Mayer (1988) has argued that financial conglomerates may also
benefit from an enhanced ability to control credit risk.  If conglomerates are
allowed to hold equity stakes and sit on the boards of borrowing firms, the
conglomerate's capacity to monitor corporate performance is enhanced.  This
permits the conglomerate to better control risk-taking by corporate managers and
provides a less costly mechanism than hostile takeovers for improving managerial
performance.
Despite the many plausible sources of economies of scope in the provision
of financial services, empirical evidence on the existence of significant economies
of scope is limited.  The traditional literature (Clark (1988), Gilbert (1984) and
Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall (1984)), which focusses exclusively on deposits
and loans in a cross-section of small banks, reports some evidence of economies
of scale and scope. The relevance of this evidence for large financial
conglomerates is doubtful.  However, recent literature which expands the
specification of the production function to include information technology (Mester
(1990)), increases the array of products (Giddy (1985)), and uses large bank data
(Shaefer (1990)), finds strong evidence of economies of scope.
In the end, however, the drive toward conglomeration may stem from
diversification concerns as much as production economies (Santomero (1984a)).
A firm may value affiliation with other financial firms to enhance the stability of
earnings.  Firms with multiple products decrease the chance of failure and,
therefore, protect their franchise better than more specialized firms.56
Synergies may also exist in the consumption of financial services;  users of
financial services may value a package of financial services from a single source
more highly than the same array of products obtained separately from several
different firms.  Evidence of such economies of scope in the consumption of
financial services, however, is largely impressionistic.  The empirical literature has
not succeeded in defining and measuring economies of scope in the consumption
of financial services.  Yet, financial institutions behave as if the potential
economies are substantial.  Profitability goals are often specified in terms of the
overall customer relationship with special emphasis on selling a number of
different products to each customer.  While customer profitability analysis is not
new (Santomero (1984b)), it has received greater emphasis (Citicorp (1989)).  
In addition to realizing economies of scope in production, the view that
cross-selling products to customers increases profitability is based on the
assumption that customers will be willing to pay more per product as the number
of products obtained from a single institutions increases.  These economies of
scope in consumption may arise from a reduction in search, information,
monitoring and transactions costs which may be realized when several financial
products may be purchased from the same firm.  The private banking business is
explicitly designed to exploit these potential economies of scope in consumption,
as are cash management accounts offered by brokerage firms.
V.C. Implications of Flexibility for Market Structure and Efficiency
Although we have identified several factors which may motivate financial
firms to offer an expanded array of financial services, it is by no means obvious
that this mode of operation will be either dominant across all financial product
lines, or that it will be attractive to all financial firms.  Specialized financial firms57
will surely continue to compete effectively by using different production or
delivery systems than their mass-market, conglomerate competitors.  They may
also choose to specialize in activities or products in which economies of scope are
unimportant. Just as boutiques continue to thrive alongside department stores,
specialized financial firms may be expected to compete effectively with financial
conglomerates in some markets under some conditions. This conclusion is given
further plausibility by consideration of some of the disadvantages of
conglomeration.
Managers of financial firms must weigh the potential economies of scope
which we have identified against several potential diseconomies of scope which
may jeopardize the efficiency of multi-product firms.  First, the sheer size of the
bureaucracy which usually accompanies a conglomerate structure may be a
disadvantage.  Bureaucratic procedures may discourage entrepreneurial activity and
impede innovative responses to changing market conditions.  Ironically, the agency
problems in organizing an appropriate response to changing customer needs, may
inhibit a conglomerate corporation from taking full advantage of its broad capacity
to respond. 
Second, the complexity of managing several different kinds of business in
one integrated structure may also erode some of the potential economies of scope.
Deal-oriented  investment bankers do not necessarily work easily with relationship-
oriented commercial bankers.  Disputes over discretion in decision-making and
compensation may lead to inefficiencies which offset many of the potential
information gains and product development opportunities.  
Third, while some customers may value one-stop financial shopping, other
customers may perceive disadvantages in the joint production of financial products.58
Some customers may be concerned that information which they share with the
conglomerate in one transaction could be used to their detriment in other
transactions. The costs of reassuring potential customers that they will not be taken
advantage of by the conglomerate may undercut some of the economies of joint
production.  And, averting such conflicts of interest between different parts of the
conglomerate may lead to a diminished ability to compete with more specialized
firms.  As a consequence, specialized firms may have a competitive advantage in
providing services to customers who are very concerned about conflicts of interest.
The advantages of joint production versus autonomous production may vary
from product to product and for a given product over time.  While it is possible to
identify several potential gains to the formation of financial conglomerates, several
offsetting disadvantages may be identified.  This may be the reason that no one
organizational structure has become dominant.  Indeed, in Germany and
Switzerland, where all banks may choose to exercise a full range of universal
banking powers, only a few of the larger banks actually offer a full range of
services.  Both multi-product and specialized firms appear to be viable.  
Although it is difficult to forecast how the financial services industry may
evolve, it is noteworthy that over the last decade technological change and
financial innovations have not necessarily enhanced the competitive position of
conglomerate firms.  Expansion in organized trading of various derivative
instruments, reductions in transactions costs, and continuing improvements in
information processing and telecommunications make it easier for small firms to
perform some of the functions of large financial conglomerates. 
One notable trend, in fact, has favored the competitive position of specialized
institutions.  The development of techniques to unbundle financial transactions has59
enabled relatively small, narrowly focussed, specialist firms to compete by
performing a particular kind of financial service very efficiently.
The important implication for policy is that the regulatory framework should
not attempt to prejudge the question of which structure is the most efficient for
providing financial services.  Entrepreneurs should be given scope to experiment
in order to determine which corporate structure enables them to best meet changing
customer needs. Unless clear evidence can be offered that restricting organizational
forms is the least costly way of achieving an important public policy objective,
financial firms should be given wide latitude to respond to market incentives.  This
will enhance competition by expanding the number of firms providing products of
various types and increase the pressure to offer these products at minimal cost.
The stakes are potentially high:  realization of economies of scope and economies
of specialization in the production of financial services will result in greater levels
of investment, a larger capital stock and a higher level of income per capita.
VI. Prudential Supervision in the World Financial Market
Whatever the choice of corporate structure, financial conglomerates that
perform a basic banking function will inevitably be regulated in an attempt to
mitigate potential social costs from bank failures that were discussed in section III.
This is made even more likely by the perception of investors that the regulatory
authorities will attempt to mitigate the impact of an abrupt bank failure which
undermines market discipline on bank risk-taking.  However, the form this
regulation should take in a complex and competitive international market is
unclear.  Just as there are several different models for organizing a financial firm,
there are several different approaches to regulating the financial industry or the
activities which it conducts.  How should regulation be organized in the global60
financial market, taking into account the benefits that the financial sector provides
and the costs and benefits of regulation itself?  This is still an open question
(Herring and Santomero (1990)).  
Two basic approaches are predominant in world markets -- institutional
regulation and functional regulation.  In Continental Europe, any institution which
performs some of the functions of a banking firm is likely to be subject to bank
regulation.  This approach may be termed "institutional" regulation. In the United
Kingdom, in contrast, the way any particular component of a financial services
institution is regulated generally depends on the kind of business it does.  This
approach may be termed "functional regulation."  Since Japan and the United
States have not yet officially accepted the universal banking model, most
commercial and investment banking functions are performed in separately
incorporated entities which are separately regulated.  In these countries institutional
regulation has been broadly congruent with functional regulation; but, as traditional
functional distinctions blur, regulatory conflicts emerge.
These contrasting approaches to regulation give rise to a complex
international regulatory framework. Within the current international regulatory
maze institutions are regulated  differently even when they undertake the same kind
of business.  Four regulatory categories may be identified:  (1) special-purpose
firms which are functionally regulated; (2) universal banks which are institutionally
regulated; (3) centrally managed groups of special-purpose institutions which are
subject to both institutional and functional regulation; and (4) centrally managed
groups of special purpose institutions which are subject to functional regulation
with regard to some activities, but are free from regulation for most of their
activities.  These contrasting regulatory approaches create substantial competitive61
tensions and give rise to demands for international harmonization of regulation that
goes well beyond the risk-adjusted capital adequacy guidelines discussed earlier.
Despite an emerging consensus that harmonization is desirable, there is no
agreement regarding how regulation should be harmonized. Both the functional and
institutional approach have their merits.  Because functional regulation is more
specialized, it is generally viewed as more sensitive to the particular features of a
specific kind of business and -- especially if systemic risks are not at issue -- is
likely to pose lower barriers to entry by new firms.  Since new entrants are often
an important source of innovation, this may contribute to the dynamic efficiency
of the financial system.  Moreover, if the functions performed by institutions vary
substantially over time, functional regulation may adapt more readily to changing
market conditions. Functional regulation may provide a more stable regulatory
framework than institutional regulation (Merton (1990)).
 When special purpose firms take on multiple functions, however, the
functional approach becomes increasingly awkward.  In addition, functional
supervision of a financial conglomerate tends to fragment prudential supervision
and may enable a financial conglomerate to avoid regulation for some activities.
If the soundness of the conglomerate as a whole (not just the conduct of particular
functions by the conglomerate) is of policy concern, this fragmentation may
jeopardize the stability of the system.   Moreover, the functional approach risks
disagreements among functional supervisors regarding the sharing of supervisory
responsibilities and the level of capital adequacy each prefers and gives rise to the
possibility of counterproductive disputes among regulators over enforcement
prerogatives and a scramble for assets in the event that the conglomerate
experiences financial difficulties.  In order to avoid such problems functional62
      The US faces an additional problem of harmonizing the activities of multiple regulators
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who supervise the same function.
supervisory authorities sometimes pressure a financial conglomerate to cordon off
the particular functions which they monitor and place them in a separately
incorporated subsidiary, perhaps insulated from the rest of the conglomerate by
firewalls.  In effect, corporate structure tends to be dictated by regulatory
convenience; but, at the social cost of some loss in efficiency.
In principle many of these problems could be mitigated by having only one
regulator or designating one functional regulator to be a lead regulator charged with
responsibility for overseeing the solvency of the financial conglomerate.  The lead
regulator would facilitate communication among different functional regulators and
coordinate responses in the event of trouble.  The lead regulator, in effect, adopts
an institutional view.  
The United Kingdom has developed the lead regulator approach to
harmonize the efforts of the numerous functional regulatory bodies which have
emerged under its Financial Services Act.    Sweden is moving toward a single
18
regulator  approach by merging the Bank Inspection Board with the Insurance
Supervisor.  Both these approaches reduce the gaps and inconsistencies which may
occur when functional regulation is applied to a conglomerate institution; however,
applying prudential supervision to the institution as a whole may convey an
impression to the market that the institution will receive official support in the
event of difficulties.  This weakens market discipline and may place specialized
institutions at a competitive disadvantage.
Is it essential that the lead regulator supervise the safety and soundness of
all activities of the conglomerate? Or can the lead regulator focus solely on the core63
banking businesses which have traditionally been regarded as their fundamental
charge?  Should the conglomerate be subjected to prudential supervision on a
consolidated basis even though there is no legal obligation to amalgamate the
resources of the separately incorporated entities in the event of trouble?  To some
extent this depends on a judgment about whether a subsidiary of a financial
conglomerate may fail without bringing down the rest of the conglomerate and
undermining confidence in the financial system.
If the market can be convinced that legal separateness is meaningful -- that
subsidiaries or affiliates may be permitted to fail without precipitating the collapse
of the parent or sister institutions -- then prudential supervision may be quite
selective and full consolidation is unnecessary.  This may also be the case if critical
functions can be protected within a failing group.  If, on the other hand, the market
views the financial firm as indissoluble and the insulation provided by operational
and legal separateness as illusory, then prudential supervision must take place on
a consolidated basis.  Otherwise the collapse of the firm may become contagious
and undermine market confidence.  Indeed, to the extent that firewalls inhibit the
transfer of funds within the firm, the lead prudential supervisor of the financial
conglomerate may seek to dismantle them because they jeopardize the safety and
soundness of the conglomerate. 
The collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (DBLG) provides some
recent evidence on the value of firewalls and the viability of functional regulation.
That DBLG collapsed is less surprising than the speed with which the end finally
came.  Although DBLG had been the most profitable investment banking firm on
Wall Street during the mid-eighties largely as a result of its introduction of junk
bonds and the merger and acquisition activities that junk bonds facilitated.  It was64
      This account of the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert is largely based on Breeden
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(1990).
mortally wounded in March 1989 when it pled guilty to six felony charges and
agreed to pay the government $650 million in fines.   Nonetheless, at the close of
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1989, DBLG reported consolidated assets of $28 billion and equity of
$835,725,000.  The broker/dealer subsidiary of DBLG, Drexel Burnham Lambert
(DBL), among the best capitalized broker/dealers in the United States, continued
to be an active player in world financial markets.  The primary-dealer subsidiary
of DBLG, Drexel Burnham Lambert Government Securities, Inc. (GSI) remained
on the elite list of 44 primary dealers with whom the Fed conducts transactions
relating to open market operations.  As part of its responsibility for maintaining
financial stability the Fed monitors primary dealers carefully to make sure that they
are sound counterparties and reliable market-makers for government securities.
Figure 4 summarizes the financial and regulatory structure of DBLG (Bush
(1990)).  The group was privately owned;  more than half the shares were owned
by Drexel employees and associated private interests, while the remaining shares
were held through a Bermuda holding company by a group of foreign investors
which included the Societé Arabe d'Investment and de Financement, Ltd., Groupe
Bruxelles Lambert, and Pargesa Holdings SA. 
DBLG had a number of subsidiaries, two of which were federally regulated.
DBL was a registered broker/dealer regulated by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and GSI was a registered government securities dealer subject
to regulations established by the US Treasury, enforced by the SEC and monitored
by the Fed.  Other subsidiaries, including DBL Trading and DBL International65
Bank, NV, a Curaçao corporation were not regulated by the federal government.
Neither was the holding company.  
This is a relatively pure example of functional regulation (Herring 1992).  In
principle, the government's interest in DBLG was in supervising the soundness of
a subset of the functions which it performed rather than in the soundness of the
institution itself.  The functions of interest -- DBLG's role as broker/dealer and
primary securities dealer -- were segregated in separately incorporated subsidiaries
which were subject to separate regulation and supervision.  Thus in a sense, the
collapse of DBLG was a test of the viability of functional regulation.
When the holding company, DBLG found that it could no longer issue
liabilities on satisfactory terms because its portfolio of junk bonds and bridge loans
had become illiquid, it began to withdraw some of its capital that exceeded
regulatory minimums from the regulated subsidiaries, DBL and GSI.  
The regulatory authorities became alarmed in early February 1990 when a
government securities dealer informed the New York Fed that it would no longer
trade with GSI.  The government securities dealer later came to an agreement with
GSI that permitted the two dealers to continue trading, but the event triggered
much closer scrutiny of the regulated firms.  The SEC and the New York Stock
Exchange prohibited DBLG from withdrawing additional excess capital from DBL
without prior permission.  
On Monday, February 12, Standard and Poor's downgraded DBLG's
Commercial Paper ending its ability to place any new issues. Also during the day,
the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange permitted DBL to lend DBLG $31
billion to meet a commercial paper payment due at the end of the day and to make
a $7 million loan to DBL Trading to enable it to make a margin payment.  They66
refused, however, to allow DBL to lend another $100 million to the holding
company or DBL trading.
DBLG had $400 million in Commercial Paper coming due in the next 48
hours.  Commercial banks had refused to extend a bridge loan that would enable
the holding company to meet the commercial paper payments.  The authorities
were faced with a choice of letting DBLG draw on almost $300 million of excess
net capital in the regulated subsidiaries to buy time in the hope that some other
financing could be arranged or to protect the regulated subsidiaries and permit the
default.  Although they were concerned about the failure of a large Wall Street
firm, the authorities held firm and limited their role to facilitating an orderly
unwinding of the affairs of DBLG and its regulated subsidiaries.
The lesson regarding functional regulation is, on the whole, encouraging.
The authorities did prevent creditors from suffering loss at either of the two
regulated subsidiaries, DBL and GSI.  On the other hand, the market was unwilling
to distinguish between the solvent, regulated subsidiaries and the rest of the firm.
It was not possible to continue to operate two solvent subsidiaries within a failing
financial group.  The market had lost confidence in the holding company and all
of its subsidiaries.  Firewalls between the regulated subsidiaries and the rest of
DBLG did not persuade the market that the regulated subsidiaries could remain as
viable firms.  Firewalls did, however, contain the collapse and leave the regulated
portion of the firm in the position to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner.
Moreover, the collapse of a major securities firm did not precipitate a financial
crisis.  Indeed the Dow Jones average closed higher than on the previous day.67
In light of the preceding discussion, what general recommendations can be
offered concerning the appropriate regulatory framework to foster an efficient
financial system?  The possibility of achieving economies of scope argues, on
efficiency grounds, for permitting a wide range of corporate structures including
financial conglomerates.  Although the empirical evidence does not imply that
conglomerates will dominate specialized firms, the conglomerate firm may have
special advantages for some kinds of services, and it may have a superior capacity
to adapt to a changing environment.  
Against the potential efficiency gain from the formation of financial
conglomerates, however, must be weighed the traditional policy concerns about
potential social costs arising from conflicts of interest, concentration of power, and
the perception that in times of crisis the government will inevitably support the
broad financial firm.  Corrigan (1987) has argued that an expansion of the
allowable activity of financial institutions requires a commensurate expansion in
the regulatory net to include all activities of financial institutions.  However, such
a broad assertion of regulatory authority would introduce regulatory inefficiencies
in highly competitive international markets.  
In the end the DBLG case argues against such an expansion and in favor of
more limited functional regulation.  Such limits, however, must be clearly
understood by both financial firms and the market in general.  As we have seen,
limitations on access to the governmental safety net imply less protection for both
the financial firm and its creditors and provide useful market discipline only when
market participants do not expect to be protected from loss.
VII. Summary and Conclusions68
An efficient financial system facilitates the optimal allocation of resources.
It expands the consumption possibility of each citizen and makes funds available
to entrepreneurs and governments alike.  When financial institutions and markets
are efficient, capital is allocated to the most promising projects which are expected
to offer the highest risk-adjusted returns.  In addition, a wide array of financial
instruments allows savers and investors to achieve their preferred trade-off
between risk and return.
However, efficient financial markets require an infrastructure of laws,
conventions and regulation.  Most of all, an efficient financial system requires
confidence.  Confidence in the financial system encourages investors to allocate
their savings through financial markets and institutions rather than to buy non-
productive assets as a store of value.  Such confidence can be fostered by
appropriate regulation of institutions and markets to ensure users of financial
services that they will receive fair treatment.
An efficient financial structure with effective regulation combines the
benefits of competitive markets along with the support of government oversight
and supervision.  However, such regulation can equally stifle the financial
community, disrupt financial flows and displace jobs to neighboring financial
centers.  Whether bad regulation is worse than none at all is moot.  The important
point, however, is that movements toward more efficient financial regulation
substantially improve economic welfare.
The challenge is to foster a static and dynamically efficient financial system
while maintaining sufficient regulatory oversight to promote confidence in the
safety and soundness of the financial system.  In the past some regulators tended
to err on the side of too much regulation, rather than too little.  However, in the69
competitive international financial markets that currently exist, this bias toward
overregulation is not sustainable.  Jobs leave. Institutions atrophy.  And economies
stagnate.  There is no real choice but to seek a dynamic financial structure that is
globally competitive and able to support the real economy with the capital needed
to succeed in the global marketplace. 70
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